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Abstract
To explain why minority group members recognize less personal than group
discrimination, research has focused on cognitive processes.   While within
self-categorization theory it may be argued the discrepancy is a function of a
salient social self that perceptually discounts the personal self, it can also be
argued that depersonalization allows for the cognitive possibility of perceiving
similar  amounts of personal and group discrimination.  The present study
suggested that, consistent with group consciousness theories, the social self
may serve to both discount as well as integrate the social self, depending on
the way in which the social self is defined.  Using structural equation
modeling,  the present study found that defining the social self along social
experiences was associated with lower personal/group discrimination
discrepancy scores which in turn were associated with greater participation in
collective action. Implications for different definitions of the social self were
discussed.
Perceiving and responding to the personal/group discrimination discrepancy
In 1948, when Israel's political right to exist as a nation was established,
Jewish families in North America and Europe began to feel safe. Previously,
the history of the Jewish people had entailed having to make the choice
between relinquishing their religion or being expelled from their own
countries.  Therefore, Israel represented a "safe haven" where individual Jews
in the diaspora would always be guaranteed their religious freedom if history
were to repeat itself.  
In 1989, when Marc Lepine killed 14 women in Montreal, the danger that
exists in the context of women's everyday lives was heightened.  While
violence against women had always existed, it seemed closer than ever when
Lepine's target for feminists entered a university campus.  It made many
women more aware that they too were personally vulnerable to violence in the
simple conduct of their daily activities.  
While these groups appear to have undergone different experiences, namely
feelings of safety versus fear, both situations exemplify groups that have
recognized how the politics of the group can affect the individual's daily
experiences.  In other words, individual group members recognized that they
may suffer personal discrimination as a function of their group membership.  
Most often however,  it appears as if minority group members are
expressing the opinion that discrimination may affect "them, but not me".
 This robust tendency to recognize group but not personal discrimination has
been labelled the "personal/group discrimination discrepancy" (Taylor, Wright,
Moghaddam & Lalonde, 1990) and has been found consistently in working
women in the United States (Crosby, 1982, 1984) and Canada (Hafer & Olson,
1993; Ruggiero & Taylor, 1994); university women (Foster & Matheson,
1995; Porter & Taylor, 1992; Ruggiero & Taylor, 1995); Canadian immigrants
(Taylor et al., 1990) and ethnic groups (Dion & Kawakami, 1996); lesbian
women (Crosby Pufall, Snyder, O'Connell & Whalen, 1989); gay men (Birt &
Dion, 1987; D'Emilio, 1983); African American men, Aboriginal peoples
(Taylor, Wright & Porter, 1994) and Canadian Francophones (Guimond &
Dubé-Simard, 1983).  
Given the robustness of the personal/group discrimination discrepancy,
researchers have focused on the possibility that the discrepancy may be a
function of the way in which humans generally process information.   For
instance,  Ruggiero and Taylor (1994) found that university and working
women generated more examples of group than personal discrimination.
 Crosby et al. (1986) found that women recognized more severe discrimination
when data about job discrimination in a company was presented to them in a
grouped (information regarding sex discrimination in several departments was
presented simultaneously on one page) rather than an individualized
(information about each department was presented on separate pages) format.
 Recently, Moghaddam, Stolkin and Hutcheson (1997) found that individuals
perceive even positive events as  affecting their group more than themselves.
 Together, these studies suggest that information about the group may be more
salient or more easily processed than information based on an individual's
experience.  Indeed, the Gestalt laws of pattern perception (e.g., Biederman,
Hilton & Hummel, 1991) whereby humans tend to recognize patterns of
stimuli rather than individual stimuli have long supported the notion that
humans may have a perceptual preference for group rather than individual-
based information. Thus, research has concentrated on explaining the
personal/group discrimination discrepancy primarily as a cognitive bias
toward perceiving group-based experiences.
Some would argue that the cognitive bias explanation of the personal/group
discrimination discrepancy is consistent with self-categorization theory
(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) which explicitly discusses
the cognitive basis of intergroup behavior.  While self-categorization theory is
a broad attempt to explain a wide range of intergroup phenomenon, there is a
particular set of assumptions and hypotheses regarding the ways in which
people categorize themselves that may aid in understanding why the
personal/group discrimination discrepancy occurs.   First, the theory delineates
ways in which people categorize themselves, in particular as individuals and
as group members.  On an individual level, the theory refers to a "personal
self-categorization" which involves an individual's sense of her/himself as
unique.  On a group level, the theory refers to a "social self-categorization"
which involves people's sense of themselves as a group member.   
Second, the theory proposes that these self-categorizations are made salient
through the process of social comparison.  The individual's sense of
her/himself as unique becomes salient in a context involving comparisons
between the self and the ingroup.  In contrast, social self-categorizations
become salient when people are in a context involving comparisons between
the ingroup and an outgroup.
When a social self-categorization is salient, it is reflected by a particular
pattern of perceptions referred to as a high "meta-contrast ratio".   A meta-
contrast ratio is defined as the ratio of the perceived differences between
members of one category and another, to the perceived differences among
members within one category (Turner, et al.,1987).  The meta-contrast ratio is
high if "between group differences" are perceived to be greater than "within
group differences".  For example, a woman whose self-categorization as a
woman is salient will perceive the differences between men and women to be
larger than differences among women.
Given the bipolar nature of similarities and differences, that is the more a
stimulus is considered similar to others in a category the less it is considered
unique (Bruner, 1957, Campbell, 1958, Rosch, 1978, Tajfel, 1969), the theory
further suggests there is "an inverse relationship between the salience of the
personal and social levels of the self-categorization" (Turner et al., 1987,
p.49).   A person cannot cognitively view themselves as unique and as a group
member at the same time.   Thus, when a social self-categorization is salient, a
personal self-categorization is "perceptually discounted".  Indeed, there is
support for this inverse relationship  in that when a personal self is salient via
ingroup comparisons, minority group members take actions to enhance their
individual status rather than group actions, and when a social self is salient via
intergroup comparisons, they are more likely to take actions to enhance the
group status rather than individual actions (Hafer & Olson, 1993; Kawakami
& Dion, 1993) .  Thus it appears that when one level of the self-categorization
is salient, the other is perceptually discounted.
This process of perceptual discounting has implications for perceiving group
versus personal discrimination.  In particular, if the salience of the social self
results in perceptually discounting the personal self, then personal and group
discrimination may not be recognized to the same degree.  Indeed, studies of
the personal/group discrimination discrepancy assess both group (e.g., women
are discriminated against in relation to men) and personal (e.g., I am
discriminated against in relation to men) discrimination using outgroup
comparisons (e.g., Crosby, 1984; Taylor et al., 1990).  As such, a social self-
categorization should become uniquely salient and a woman's experiences will
 be processed at the group level alone, allowing for easier recognition of group
discrimination.   Because a social self-categorization presumably discounts the
personal self-categorization however, a woman will not be processing
information on an individual level, and therefore will be unlikely to recognize
personal discrimination. Thus a discrepancy between personal and group
discrimination is maintained.    Empirically, the robustness of the
personal/group discrimination discrepancy despite a salient social identity
suggests that the discrepancy may indeed be a cognitive bias such that a salient
social self discounts perceptions of personal discrimination (Crosby et al.,
1989; Porter & Taylor, 1992) .
At the same time however, self-categorization theory also refers to the
notion of “depersonalization” which occurs when an individuals’ social self
becomes salient to such an extent that they view themselves as an
“interchangeable exemplar” of their ingroup (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50).  In
other words, the individual is her/his group.  This reflects an integration of the
personal and social self-categorization (Turner et al., 1987), rather than
personal and social selves that are inversely related.   Empirically,
depersonalization is also supported by Smith and Henry (1996) who found that
reaction times to trait self-descriptions were quicker when these traits also
described the ingroup rather than the outgroup, suggesting that individual
descriptions can encompass social elements.  In relation to intergroup
behavior, women have been shown to participate in more collective action
when they perceived both group and personal discrimination than when they
perceived personal discrimination alone (Foster & Matheson, 1995).   Taken
together, these studies suggest the social and personal selves might indeed be
integrated.   The implication for a social self that has integrated the personal
self may be that similar, rather than discrepant assessments of both personal
and group discrimination could potentially be made.  If the personal self has
become depersonalized such that a woman sees herself as a group member
rather than a unique individual, then presumably whatever happens to the
group has happened or could happen to her.  Under these circumstances, the
perceived discrepancy between personal and group discrimination would
decrease.  Thus, self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) appears to
allow for two roles of a salient social self, both having different implications
for the magnitude of the personal/group discrimination discrepancy.  On the
one hand, it may be argued the discrepancy is a function of a cognitive bias
such that a salient social self discounts the perception of personal
discrimination (Crosby et al., 1986; Hafer & Olson, 1993; Kawakami & Dion,
1993 ; Moghaddam et al., 1997; Ruggiero & Taylor, 1994).  On the other hand,
it may also be argued that depersonalization allows for the cognitive
possibility of corresponding amounts of personal and group discrimination
(Foster & Matheson, 1995; Smith & Henry, 1996).
While the notion of depersonalization suggests there should be no
discrepancy between perceived personal and group discrimination, the
robustness of the personal/group discrimination discrepancy (e.g., Crosby,
1984; Dion & Kawakami, 1996; Hafer & Olson, 1993; Taylor et al., 1990)
implies that an integration of the social and personal self does not occur.
    However, this may be an artifact of how the social self is defined.
  Typically, a social self-categorization has been operationally defined as a
high meta-contrast ratio, which is described as occurring along the
"stereotypical dimensions which define the relevant ingroup membership"
(Turner, et al., 1987, p. 50).   Stereotyped traits are commonly used to reflect
the dimensions along which to measure the meta-contrast ratio because of their
presumed relevance to definitions of the group (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Lee,
1992; Oakes & Turner, 1990; Stephan, 1977; Turner, et al., 1987; Turner &
Oakes, 1986,1989; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994).   For example,
a woman’s social self-categorization is said to be salient when she perceives
differences between men and women to be larger than differences among
women in terms of their tendency to be “emotional” or “sensitive”.  Thus,
minority group members’s social identities are often operationally defined
along intrinsic, stereotyped traits.
However, if minority group members are defining themselves in terms of
intrinsic personality characteristics, then when they are asked to assess
situations of discrimination, they may also make internal attributions for a
situation they personally experience rather than defining it as stemming from
group-based discrimination.  Consider a young woman who has just been told
by her college guidance counselor that she should consider studying early
childhood education rather than science because women tend to excel in those
areas.  If she defines women along stereotyped traits such as nurturing and as
such considers women to have a "nurturing personality", she might internalize
this situation, reasoning that as a woman, her personality is better suited to
early childhood education than to science.  The situation she has just
experienced would be therefore be defined as reflecting internal aspects of
herself (“it’s my personality”).  Consequently, when she is asked whether she
has experienced personal discrimination due to gender, her response will likely
be "no".  Thus, defining the social self along intrinsic traits may serve to
maintain a distinction between the personal and social self, and as such, a
perceived discrepancy between personal and group discrimination.
In contrast, group consciousness (Bartky, 1977, Bowles & Duelli Klein,
1983 Dreifus, 1973, Wilkinson & Schneider, 1990) and new social movement
theories (Friedman & McAdam, 1992; Gamson, 1992) are based on the grass-
roots experiences of minority groups attempting to challenge traditional
definitions of their group.  These theories define the social self as being
integrated with the personal self rather than being inversely related, telling
women that the “personal is political” (Carey, 1980, Dreifus, 1973, Stanley &
Wise, 1983,  Wilkinson & Schneider, 1990).  Women were encouraged to
make this connection between the person and the group in the feminist
consciousness-raising groups of the 1970s (e.g., Carey, 1980; Dreifus, 1973).
 These groups encouraged women to share their experiences and in so doing
they discussed various issues such as abuse from husbands, rape and verbal
assaults, the meanings of femininity and sexuality, lack of work, lack of
respect at work, being secretaries, mothers, and husbands' maids and cooks. As
women shared their experiences it became more apparent that many other
women had encountered similar incidents and that the individual woman was
"not the only one".   In essence, they were recognizing similarities among
women and differences between women and men, or a high meta-contrast ratio
along social experiences that stemmed from factors outside of the individual.
By defining women along shared social experiences rather than intrinsic
traits, a personal experience of group-based discrimination may be defined as
such, rather than internalized.  Consider again the woman who is told by her
guidance counsellor that she should consider early child education programs
rather than science in college.  By defining women in terms of shared social
experiences (e.g., “women as a group who experience limited educational
opportunities”) she may externalize this situation, reasoning that her
counselor's advice was an example of how women are discriminated against in
the education system, as opposed to being an accurate reflection of her
"nurturing personality".  In turn, by making an external attribution for this
experience, when she is asked whether she has experienced personal
discrimination due to gender, she will likely respond "yes".  Thus, the
examination of alternative theories of group identity (group consciousness)
suggests that by defining the social self differently  (along external social
experiences rather than internal stereotyped traits) there may indeed be an
integration of the personal and social selves, which may decrease the
perceived discrepancy between personal and group discrimination.
Not only do group consciousness theories describe the antecedents of a
reduced personal/group discrimination discrepancy, but they also refer to the
consequences. Specifically,  collective action is presumably most likely when
the individual and group experiences have become integrated.  For example,
the slogan “personal is political” served as motivation for collective action in
the 1970s (Carey, 1980; Dreifus, 1973).  The more individual women believed
their personal experiences were integrated with the group’s, the more the
group’s problem (discrimination) became personally relevant.  As the group
problem became more relevant,  the solution (collective action) also became
viewed as important for the individual’s status.  Thus, according to group
consciousness theories, a reduced personal/group discrepancy should be
associated with greater collective action.
This is consistent with s elf-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) which
predicts that all group behavior, including collective action is a function of
depersonalization.   Once individuals view themselves as an interchangeable
exemplar of their group, their actions are directed at enhancing the group
rather than themselves.  As such, greater collective action should occur.   Little
research has been done however on the relationship between the
personal/group discrimination discrepancy and intergroup behavior.  Most
research on the discrepancy focuses on its explanations (e.g.,Moghaddam et
al., 1997). Further, research that does examine antecedents for collective
action (e.g., relative deprivation theory) has traditionally focused on
perceptions of group discrimination alone, ignoring the notion of an integrated
personal and social self as motivation for action (e.g., Guimond & Dubé-
Simard, 1983; Walker & Mann, 1987; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984).
The present study was therefore conducted to examine possible antecedents
and consequences of perceiving the personal/group discrimination
discrepancy.   It was hypothesized that a social self-categorization defined
along intrinsic traits may serve to maintain a distinction between the
experiences of personal and social selves, maintaining the perceived
discrepancy between personal and group discrimination.  In contrast, a social
self defined along external experiences may serve to integrate the experiences
of personal and social selves, reducing the perceived discrepancy between
personal and group discrimination.  Consistent with both group consciousness
(eg., Bartky, 1973) and self-categorization theories (Turner et al., 1987), a
reduced personal/group discrimination discrepancy may be associated with
greater collective action.  
Method
Participants and Procedure
Women in an Introductory Psychology course at Carleton University who
had indicated a willingness to participate in a study to partially fulfil their
course requirement were telephoned.  They were asked if they would complete
a 45-minute questionnaire 1 which would be given at Carleton University.
 Questionnaires were completed in groups of 5-15 ( N = 141; Mean age = 22.0;
range 18-55).     Once the questionnaires were completed, students were given
an oral and written debriefing regarding the purpose of the study.
Materials
      Meta-contrast ratios.      
Participants first indicated their perceptions of ingroup and intergroup
variability by rating how similar women are to each other and how similar
women and men 2 are along five social experiences (being paid less than men
for equal work; feeling unsafe (e.g., walking along after dark); having to work
harder than men to get ahead;  having fewer career opportunities than men;
experience with sexual harassment) and six stereotyped traits (nurturing;
emotional; sensitive; yielding; understanding; and childlike) 3 . Responses
were assessed along a scale ranging from "not at all similar" (0) to "extremely
similar" (4).  
In order to compute the meta-contrast ratios for each item, scores on both
measures of ingroup and intergroup variability were then recoded such that
higher scores reflected higher perceptions of ingroup and intergroup
differences (Turner et al., 1987).  These scores were then transformed by
adding a constant of 1, in order to avoid any division by zero in the calculation
of meta-contrast ratios.  From these scores, a meta-contrast ratio was
computed by dividing perceptions of intergroup differences by perceptions of
ingroup differences.  Scores could range from 0.2 to 5.00.  Meta-contrast ratios
greater than 1 represented greater perceived intergroup than ingroup
differences, or in other words, a salient social identity along a particular
(Turner et al., 1987).   
Personal/group discrimination discrepancy.     In order to assess the
personal/group discrimination discrepancy, "discrepancy scores" (Chaiken &
Baldwin, 1981; Taylor et al., 1994) were computed from participants'
perceptions of personal and group discrimination along the same five
experiences that were used to assess the meta-contrast ratios along social
experiences.   In particular, participants were asked to indicate how much
personal and group discrimination they perceived in terms of "receiving less
pay for the same jobs as men"; "having to face greater threat to their personal
safety on a day to day basis"; "having to work harder than men to get the same
recognition"; "not receiving the same career opportunities as men"; "being
victims of sexual harassment".   Responses were assessed along a scale
ranging from "not at all discriminated against" (0) to "extremely discriminated
against" (4).
To compute the discrepancy scores,  participants' personal discrimination
score was subtracted from their group discrimination score for each
dimension.   Thus, five discrepancy scores were computed.  Higher scores
reflected larger personal/group discrimination discrepancies, or in other words,
the perception that group relative to personal discrimination was high.
Collective action .   Based on a scale from Foster and Matheson (1995),
participants indicated on a scale ranging from 0 (never participate) to 4
(always participate) how often they participate in a list of six actions geared at
enhancing women’s status, during their everyday life. Collective action was
defined as any behavior directed at enhancing the group status (Wright, Taylor
& Moghaddam, 1990).   Behaviors included private actions such as "I have
gone out of my way to collect information on women's issues," as well as
increasingly more public actions such as  “I encourage friends to join
organizations that deal with women’s issues” ; “I talk about women’s issues
with family or friends, stressing the need to enhance women’s positions in
society”; “I attend talks on women’s issues”, “Whenever there is an organized
protest, I attend the protest”, “I participate in fundraisers, consciousness-
raising events etc. that attempt to increase the overall status of women”. The
list of actions was originally derived from Lalonde and Cameron (1993) but
was reworded to maintain context specificity for women.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
To examine the nature of women’s definitions of their social selves, means
and standard deviations for the variables in the model were calculated (see
Table 1).  In particular, it appears that all but one meta-contrast ratio
(childlike) was greater than one, indicating that women overall appeared to
view women as similar to each other but different from men in terms of both
stereotypes and social experiences. Because the childlike meta-contrast ratio
was not significantly different from 1, t(139) = -.78, ns, it was retained.
Consistent with past research, women reported greater group than personal
discrimination in terms of pay equity, personal safety, having to work harder
than men, fewer career opportunities and sexual harassment.  While the mean
differences were small, effect sizes ranged from 14% to 39%, indicating
meaningful differences (see Table 1).
Finally, women tended to participate in collective actions relatively
frequently in their lives ( M = 2.72, SD = .93).  
Structural Model
The analysis was performed on a reduced sample size of 117 women who
reported perceiving group discrimination.   Group discrimination was
measured by taking a mean score across the five group discrimination items .
 Women who reported little or no group discrimination (i.e., those who scored
below the midpoint, 2) were eliminated from the sample to ensure that the
conceptual and operational definitions of the personal/group discrimination
discrepancy matched.  While it is possible that a discrepancy could exist
between perceiving little group discrimination and even less personal
discrimination, the construct has been theoretically defined as recognizing that
discrimination happens to one’s group, but not to oneself (Crosby, 1984).
 Therefore, to remain theoretically consistent, only women who reported
recognizing group discrimination were included in the analysis.
Structural equation modelling, which tests hypotheses about patterns of
relationships among latent variables, was used to assess the multivariate
relationships between the meta-contrast ratios along social experiences and
stereotypes, as well between the personal/group discrimination discrepancy
and collective action.  Assessment of fit of the measurement models, as well as
the structural equation model, was based on several indices.   Although the  χ 2
statistic tests how well the hypothesized model data fits the observed data, it
does not tend to be accurate in small samples (Bentler & Bonnet, 1980; Byrne,
1989).   Thus, researchers suggest that the χ 2 be reported, but that it not be
used as the primary index of goodness of fit (Hoyle & Panter, 1995; Hu &
Bentler, 1995).  
Instead, alternative indices of fit are utilized in structural equation
modelling.  First,  the average off-diagonal residuals were examined, which
represent the average amount of correlation between the hypothesized and
observed data that is unexplained by the model .  If residuals are small, the
model is considered to exhibit good fit of the data (Hu & Bentler, 1995).  A
second criterion is the Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) which
ranges from 0 to 1.00, with .90 ore greater indicating adequate fit of the data
(Byrne, 1994; Hoyle & Panter, 1995; Hu & Bentler, 1995). A third criterion is
the Parsimony Comparative Fit Index (PCFI; Mulaik, James, Van Alstine,
Bennett, Lind, & Stilwell, 1989), which takes into account degrees of freedom.
  Because high CFI values can occur due to low degrees of freedom, the PCFI
compensates for this problem.  Values of .50 accompanying CFI values of .90,
have been considered acceptable fit of the data (Mulaik et al., 1989), and
recently values of .80 are considered to be better fit of the data (see Byrne,
1994).  Finally, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)
represents the amount of error in approximating the population data by the
sample data.  Values of less than .05 are considered to reflect close fit of the
data, values between .05 and .08 reflect moderate fit of the data, and values
above .1 reflect poor fit of the data (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; MacCallum,
Browne & Sugawara, 1996).  The RMSEA also provides a 90% confidence
interval for the value.  While all indices are generally considered, research
suggests that when there is a dispute between the indices, the residuals are the
most reliable (Byrne, 1991; Hu & Bentler, 1995). All models  (see Table 2)
were assessed using EQS, a statistical package designed to test structural
models (Bentler & Wu, 1995). Maximum likelihood estimation, with the
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Statistic correction was used due to small sample size
(Byrne, 1994; Hu & Bentler, 1995).
The first step in testing the model was to ensure that the measurement
models, that is, the variables measuring each of the four latent variables
adequately measured the factors they were designed to assess (Byrne, 1989).
 Thus, confirmatory factor analyses were performed to assess the fit for each
latent variable (meta-contrast ratio along social issues and stereotypes, the
personal/group discrimination discrepancy and collective action).   These
measurement models were specified such that each factor could be explained
by the indicator variables designed to measure it, and the error terms would be
uncorrelated.
As Table 2 indicates, all indices for the measurement models suggested that
each of the variables were good estimates of the latent variables they were
designed to measure 4 .  In particular, the X 2 values were non-significant,
suggesting no significant differences between the observed and hypothesized
data.  The CFI values ranged between .96 and .99, indicating very good fit of
the data, and PCFI values are consistent with these high CFI values.   While
the RMSEA values for stereotypes and collective action were close to .1
(indicating poor fit of the data), the rest of the indices imply good fit of the
data.  Given the dispute, the small residuals were relied upon, suggesting good
fit of the data for all the measurement models (e.g., Hu & Bentler, 1995).  
Given that the measurement models were stable, a structural model was then
specified, hypothesizing that larger meta-contrast ratios along stereotypes
would be related to larger reported personal/group discrimination discrepancy
scores, while smaller meta-contrast ratios along social experiences would be
related to smaller reported discrepancy scores, which in turn would be related
to greater participation in collective action.  As Table 2 indicates, CFI was .92,
and the PCFI was high (.82), indicating good fit of the data.  The residuals
were also small (.07), also indicating good fit of the data,  and the RMSEA and
its confidence interval suggest acceptable fit of the data.  Taken together, these
indices suggest the hypothesized model provides good fit of the data.
As hypothesized, the path coefficients indicate that larger meta-contrast
ratios along stereotypes were associated with a larger perceived
personal/group discrimination discrepancy (See Figure 1).  In contrast, larger
meta-contrast ratios along social experiences were associated with a smaller
perceived personal/group discrimination discrepancy, which was also
associated with greater participation in collective action.
Discussion
To explain why minority group members recognize less personal than group
discrimination, psychological research has focused on cognitive processes.
 While it may be argued the discrepancy is a function of a cognitive bias such
that a salient social self discounts the perception of personal discrimination
(e.g., Kawakami & Dion, 1993 ; Moghaddam et al., 1997), it can also be
argued that depersonalization allows for the cognitive possibility of perceiving
similar amounts of personal and group discrimination (e.g., Smith & Henry,
1996). The present study suggested there may be ways in which the social self
can serve to both discount as well as integrate the social self, depending on the
way in which the social self is defined.
As expected,  greater meta-contrast ratios along stereotypes were associated
with larger discrepancy scores indicating that the more strongly women
defined their group in terms of stereotypes, the greater was their perceived
discrepancy between group and personal discrimination.  This finding appears
to support the process of the cognitive discounting of a personal self by a
social self as is suggested by self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987).
  If women are defining the group along intrinsic stereotyped traits, then
group-based treatment (discrimination) may be similarly attributed to personal
characteristics.   While the present study did not measure the extent to which
women were internalizing situations of discrimination,  past research has
found that women’s endorsement of traditional stereotypes is related to
making internal attributions for their own failures (Neto, 1995) and for
experiences of sexual harassment (Jensen & Gutek, 1982).   Thus, when the
group is defined along intrinsic stereotyped traits, personal blame for
discrimination may be accentuated, which in turn may decrease the
recognition that personal experiences of discrimination are instead due to
group circumstances.  Ironically then, a social self defined along stereotypes
may indeed serve to keep the personal and social selves distinct, but not
through a “discounted” perception of the personal self.  Rather, the personal
self may in fact be accentuated in that women may be blaming themselves for
experiences that are actually a function of discrimination against their group.
 Thus, a larger personal/group discrimination discrepancy may be a function of
an accentuated sense of the personal self.
In contrast, when the social self was defined along shared external
experiences (higher meta-contrast ratios along social issues), women reported
a reduced personal/group discrimination discrepancy.  Some may argue that
the association between defining the group along shared external experiences
and the personal/group discrimination discrepancy may have occurred because
both latent variables were measured along the similar items.  For instance,
women rated how similar they thought women were to each other, and
different from men in terms of their experience with sexual harassment, and as
well indicated how much they had experienced sexual harassment.  Clearly,
the measures of trait-based stereotypes were not so directly linked to the
measures of the personal/group discrimination discrepancy.  However, the
association between the meta-contrast ratio along experiences and the
personal/group discrimination discrepancy is not likely due to shared
measurement error for two reasons.  First, one of the benefits of structural
equation modeling is that it indicates measurement error; the present model
indicated no significant shared error among the items measuring the meta-
contrast ratio along social experiences and those assessing the discrepancy.
 Second, a shared measurement explanation of the relationships between these
two latent variables could not account for the direction of the association,
which was as hypothesized, negative.   Thus, the role that the meta-contrast
ratio along social experiences may serve in reducing the personal/group
discrimination discrepancy is not likely an artifact of measurement.
Instead, defining the group along social experiences may be one way in
which depersonalization occurs .   It may be that if women are defining their
group identity along external factors, then group-based treatment may be
similarly attributed to external sources.  If a woman defines her social group
along external characteristics, then when she encounters a situation of social
discrimination she will likely externalize the blame.  Thus, the personal self, in
the form of personal blame may actually be discounted.  Paradoxically, by
discounting personal blame women will recognize greater personal
discrimination in relation to group discrimination because they may define
personal experiences of discrimination as being due to gender rather than
being due to their own characteristics.  Personal experience therefore becomes
defined as a group experience, or in other words, the personal and social self
become integrated.
When the personal and social selves are integrated, self-categorization
theory (Turner et al., 1987) suggests any group behavior, including collective
action is likely to occur.  Similarly, group consciousness (e.g., Wilkinson &
Schneider, 1990) and new social movement theories (e.g., Friedman &
McAdam, 1992; Gamson, 1992) would suggest that a reduced personal/group
discrimination discrepancy should also encourage collective action. These
theories suggest that by recognizing that both group and personal
discrimination, women have recognized that “what happens to the group,
happens to me”, or in other words they have  integrated the personal and social
experiences.  As such, the social group may be more personally relevant, and
participation in group-oriented behavior such as collective action may seem
more important and worthwhile to enhancing individual status. Consistent
with this hypothesis, the present study found that as women reported smaller
discrepancies between personal and group discrimination, their participation in
collective action increased.
The association between the personal/group discrimination discrepancy and
collective action however was small, indicating the need to understand
additional variables that may motivate collective action.   Certain negative
emotions may play an important role in understanding the relationship
between the personal/group discrimination discrepancy and taking action.
 While a reduced discrepancy may make the group experience personally
relevant, it may at the same time be anxiety provoking to recognize the extent
to which society can impact on the individual (Crosby, 1984).  As such,
consistent with learned helplessness theories (e.g., Seligman, 1975) the anxiety
may reduce instrumental behaviors, attenuating the relationships between
recognizing personal discrimination and taking collective action.   While
feelings of discontent have been found to be associated with reduced
participation in collective action (Foster & Matheson, in press), future research
will need to examine how more extreme emotions such as anxiety, as well as
ways to relieve that anxiety (e.g., coping strategies, social resources) may
mediate the relationship between the personal/group discrimination
discrepancy and taking collective action.
Some might also argue that collective action may have been related to the
meta-contrast ratios, and as such a mediating model should have been implied
and tested.    While a mediating model is indeed possible, the present paper did
not put forth a theoretical rationale that hypothesizes a mediating model.  To
do that, two hypotheses would have to have been made.  First, it would have
been hypothesized  that there is a  relationship between the meta-contrast
ratios and collective action.  While such a relationship may exist, the primary
purpose of the present study was to test the antecedents of the discrepancy
(meta-contrast ratios) and the directions of the relationships between the meta-
contrast ratios and the discrepancy.  Thus, a theoretical rationale for an
association between the meta-contrast ratios and action was not developed.
 The second hypothesis that would need to be made to test a mediating model
is that the relationship between the meta-contrast ratios and collective action
should disappear when the personal/group discrimination discrepancy is
considered.  However, we did not want to assume such a relationship should
disappear, especially given the consistent relationship between beliefs about a
group’s lower status and their endorsement of actions to enhance their status
(e.g., Foster & Matheson, 1995; Hafer & Olson, 1993) .  For these reasons, a
mediating model was neither postulated nor tested in the present study.
Although there was a small association between the personal/group
discrimination discrepancy and action, it is an important relationship in that it
highlights the need to consider how the social self is being defined and how
this in turn affects perceptions of the personal self.  Traditionally however,
North American society tends to promote a disjunction between the individual
and their social group.   “Rugged individualism” is valued over depending on
others, and this is often reflected in psychological concepts.  For instance,
maturity is often marked in a North American child when they show
independence while immaturity is marked by consulting with others
(Kohlberg, 1963).  However, as the present study suggests, the less connected
individual group members are to their group experience, the less important
group change may become.  In contrast, whether the connection between the
group and the individual is motivated by safety or fear, both Jews in the
Diaspora, and women in Canada played a role in social changes such as the
economic support of Israel and changes in Canadian gun laws, respectively.
 Thus, by examining theories based in grass-roots experiences of groups trying
to alter the status quo, insight may be gained into how a connection between
the person and the group can be encouraged, and how this connection is
important for social change.
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Footnotes.
1.     The questionnaire’s length was a function of other measures included in
the package (used for a different study). They followed those used in the
present study.
2.      Consistent with self-categorization theory, meta-contrast ratios are
measured along dimensions relevant to group membership.  Thus, in order to
ensure the dimensions along which the meta-contrast ratios were assessed
would indeed be  relevant to women,  an independent sample of university
women (N=75) were asked to report in an open-ended format, the types of
traits and issues that are relevant to women today (Foster, 1995).  Responses
were examined for recurring themes in terms of the social experiences that
viewed as important to women, and stereotyped traits that were regarded as
applicable to women. Thus, all dimensions in the present study had been
piloted and reflect dimensions relevant to this sample.
3.     Meta-contrast ratios are generally conceptualized in terms of differences
between groups, but measured in terms of similarities (e.g., Haslam & Turner,
1992).  Thus, in the present study similarity scores were recoded to reflect
differences to remain consistent with the theoretical conceptualization.
4.     Because of space concerns, and given that loadings change once the full
model is tested, the loadings for each of the confirmatory factor analyses were
not included in this manuscript.  However, that information is available from
the authors upon request.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics for variables in the model
Variables                 M       SD   Confidence Interval
Meta-contrast ratios along social experiences
Pay Equity                2.09    1.21    1.90 - 2.32
Personal Safety            2.69    1.43    2.48 - 2.97
Working Harder            2.09    1.16    1.89 - 2.29
Career Opportunities            1.51      .96    1.35 - 1.68
Sexual Harassment            2.05    1.11    1.88 - 2.26
Meta-contrast ratios along stereotypes
Sensitive                1.51      .71    1.32 - 1.53
Emotional                1.60      .81    1.40 - 1.64
Nurturing                1.43      .61    1.47 - 1.75
Childlike                  .97      .49      .89 - 1.57
Yielding                1.22      .56    1.13 - 1.32
Understanding            1.32      .60    1.21 - 1.28
Personal/Group
Discrimination     Group            Personal        Discrepancy
Discrepancies        Discrimination    Discrimination    Score        η 2
Pay Equity            3.81            3.01          .70        .389
Personal Safety        3.80            3.42          .38        .142
Working Harder        3.41            2.80          .60        .268
Career Opportunities        3.19            2.62          .57        .266
Sexual Harassment        3.96            3.27          .69        .365
Note: Group and personal discrimination t-scores differed at p < .05
Table 2




X 2     df        residuals    CFI    PCFI    RMSEA      CI
Social experiences           5.11 a     5        .04        .99    .50    .04            .00-.14
Stereotypes                        8.04 a     9        .05
           .99    .60    .09            .02-.15   
Personal/Group
Discrimination
Discrepancy                    7.70 a     5        .04        .98    .49    .06            .00-.15
Collective Action                13.16 a
    9        .03        .99    .60    .09            .02-.15
Full Model
               262.33      205    .07        .92    .82    .06            .05-.08
Note: a refers to a X 2 > .05, indicating that there are no significant differences
between the hypothesized and observed data.
Figure Caption
Figure 1 .  Structural model of the relationships between meta-contrast ratios,
personal/group discrimination discrepancy, and collective actions.
